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Abstract
We describe and characterize the family of asymmetric parametric division
rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims. We use two approaches to
characterize this family. The first approach follows the existing literature in
defining a claims problem. As part of the characterization in this setting, we
present two novel axioms which restrict how a division rule indirectly allocates
between different versions of the same claimant. The second approach departs
from the existing literature by expanding the definition of a claims problem to
allow claimants to have multiple claims. The characterization in this setting
uses the same set of axioms, though modified for this expanded domain, used
by Young (1987) to characterize the family of symmetric parametric division
rules. We show that these two approaches are essentially equivalent.
1 Introduction
When a firm goes bankrupt, how should its liquidated value be distributed among
creditors? How should an estate be divided among heirs when more is promised in a
will than is available? How should the cost of a project be shared among the group
of beneficiaries? What is a fair way to tax citizens?
The first two questions are known as conflicting claims problems, or simply claims
problems. The problem is how to distribute fairly some good when there is an insuf-
ficient amount of the good to satisfy all claims on it. A solution to the problem is a
division rule, which assigns to every claims problem an allocation, or award, to the
claimants. We classify division rules by the axioms they satisfy. The problem is as
old as human history, and specific examples with proposed awards are even offered
in the Talmud. The problem was first formalized by O’Neill (1982), and since then
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Rodrigo Velez, Marek Kaminski, Herve´ Moulin, Christopher Chambers, and seminar participants
at the University of Rochester for comments. I especially thank William Thomson for his guidance
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numerous rules and axioms have been proposed.1 Formally, the claims problem is
identical to the problems of cost-sharing and fair taxation, though we will primarily
use the claims interpretation.
We characterize a family of division rules which we call asymmetric parametric
rules, a generalization of Young’s (1987) class of (symmetric) parametric rules, and
which was first introduced by Thomson (2006, p. 99). Asymmetric parametric rules
divide as follows: There is a family of continuous monotone functions {fi} indexed
by all the possible claimants. Each fi represents a schedule of possible awards that
specifies how much claimant i is awarded over all possible values of his claim and
all possible values of a parameter. So the amount awarded to i is determined by
his claim, ci, and a parameter, λ, and is written fi (ci, λ). For a given problem, a
common parameter is chosen for all claimants so that all of the good is distributed.
Intuitively, one can think of the parameter as some sort of measure of fairness, and
the function fi (ci, ·) is then simply the translation of this measure to an award. The
choice of a common parameter implies that the claimants are being treated equitably
with respect to this standard of fairness.
One of the main axioms used in our characterization is Consistency, which states
that if a division rule chooses an allocation for a group of claimants, then it should
not choose to reallocate the awards of any subgroup when considered as a separate
problem. Obviously, asymmetric parametric rules do not satisfy the axiom Symmetry,
which states that claimants with equal claims should receive equal awards.
We study asymmetric division rules for normative and positive reasons. For rea-
sons of fairness, we may not want a rule to be symmetric. As an informal example,
parents may treat their children differently because they recognize each child is dif-
ferent and has different needs, even though the children might protest that they are
being treated asymmetrically. More generally, there may be considerations outside
of the model (e.g. rights, needs, history) that require a rule to treat claimants asym-
metrically. Thus, depending on the context of the problem, fairness may require a
rule to be asymmetric.
From a descriptive stand point, there are many rules, especially real-life rules,
that are not symmetric. For example, U.S. bankruptcy law stipulates that when a
firm goes bankrupt, taxes owed to the federal government must be paid before other
claims (see Kaminski (2000, 2006)). The forming of a queue (e.g., to purchase tickets
to a popular concert, to get something for free as part of a marketing promotion, to
withdraw money during a bank run) is another example. Thus by relaxing Symmetry
we are able to better understand these common division rules.
We use two approaches to characterize this family of division rules. To understand
the differences between these two approaches, observe that an asymmetric parametric
rule could potentially allocate intrapersonally. That is, one could observe how a rule
might allocate between different versions of the same claimant by comparing, say,
fi (ci, ·) to fi (c′i, ·), where ci and c′i are different claims i could have. However in the
traditional formulation of a problem, a division rule does not allocate intrapersonally,
as a problem cannot have the same claimant with two different claims.
1See Thomson (2003) for a survey.
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The first approach we take follows this convention in defining a problem, and so a
division rule does not directly allocate intrapersonally. However a division rule does
indirectly allocate intrapersonally. That is, one could observe how a rule allocates
between i when his claim is ci and a second “go-between” claimant, j, with claim
cj, and then compare that to how the rule allocates between i with claim c
′
i and
j with claim cj. This would reveal how the rule allocates intrapersonally. This ap-
proach requires adding two novel axioms. The first, Intrapersonal Consistency, states
that how the rule (indirectly) allocates between different versions of claimant i will
not change when the go-between’s claim cj changes. It may be that there are some
intrapersonal allocations that cannot be compared, meaning there is no go-between
claimant that would reveal how the rule intrapersonally allocates over some prob-
lems. The second axiom, Non-comparability Continuity in Claims at Priority Points
(or N-Continuity for short), states that the non-comparability of two allocations is a
continuous relation with respect to small changes in the claim. The axioms that char-
acterize asymmetric parametric rules are Continuity, N-Continuity, a weaker version
of Consistency known as Bilateral Consistency, Intrapersonal Consistency, and Re-
source Monotonicity. We also show that if Resource Monotonicity is strengthened to
Strict Resource Monotonicity, the resulting characterization can be derived without
Intrapersonal Consistency and N-Continuity.
The second approach we take allows for direct intrapersonal comparisons by ex-
panding the definition of a problem. Such an expansion requires division rules to
determine awards in hypothetical situations where one claimant has two different
claims. In this setting, the set of axioms that characterize asymmetric parametric
rules is the same used by Young to characterize parametric rules, namely Continuity,
Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry, though Symmetry is considerably weaker here
than in the classical domain.
We show that these two approaches essentially characterize the same family of di-
vision rules. Hence, the first approach makes explicit the additional assumptions that
are implicit when one imposes Young’s axioms on the expanded domain in the second
approach. It also demonstrates that relaxing Symmetry can be an easier exercise than
one would initially think.
There is a growing literature on asymmetric division rules. Moulin (2000) de-
rives a rich family of asymmetric rules that satisfy Consistency, as well as axioms not
considered here, namely Upper Composition, Lower Composition, and Homogeneity.
Chambers (2006) studies a similar family, though without imposing Homogeneity.
Naumova (2002) characterizes an asymmetric version of Young’s (1988) family of
equal sacrifice rules. The key axioms there are Consistency, Upper Composition,
and Strict Resource Monotonicity. Hokari and Thomson (2003) characterize a fam-
ily of asymmetric rules which generalize the Talmud rule, and derive the consistent
extensions of these rules.
Kaminski (2006) accommodates division rules like the US bankruptcy rule by
expanding a claims problem so that claimants have “types”, and not just claims.
Thus, characteristics of the claimant (other than his claim) may affect his award, and
so claimants with identical claims may receive different awards if their types differ in
other respects. Formally, the expanded definition of a problem that we give in the
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second approach is a special case of Kaminski’s definition, though the two models
differ in their interpretation of types. The relation of the present work to Kaminski’s
is discussed further in Section 4. Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai (2007) similarly expand
a problem to allow for multi-dimensional claims, though their focus is on rules that
give no benefit to claimants who transfer claims between themselves (an axiom called
Reallocation-proofness). Their model also accommodates the US bankruptcy rule.
The paper follows the following outline. Section 2 formalizes the classic claims
problem, and describes several examples of division rules, including the family of
asymmetric parametric rules. Section 3 discusses the axioms and characterizes the
family of asymmetric parametric rules in the classic domain. Section 4 describes the
expanded domain and characterizes the family of asymmetric parametric rules in
that domain. We show that the two approaches are essentially equivalent in Section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Definitions
The conflicting claims problem is simple: there is a group of people, each of whom
has a claim on some divisible, homogeneous good, but there is an insufficient amount
of the good to satisfy all of the claims. Formally, a (classic claims) problem is a tuple
(N, c, E) where N ⊂ N is a finite group of claimants, c = (ci)i∈N ∈ RN++ is the vector
of claims, and E ∈ R+ is the endowment to be divided, all satisfying E ≤
∑
N ci. Let
C denote the set of problems. For a fixed group N , let CN denote the set of problems
for N . We will typically write a problem as (c, E) with the assumption that the group
of claimants is N . An awards vector for a problem (c, E) is an allocation x ∈ RN+
satisfying
∑
N xi = E and 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci for every i ∈ N . A division rule is a function
S that maps every problem to an awards vector.
A convenient way of graphically representing a division rule is the path of awards
it generates. For a fixed set of claimants and for a fixed claims vector for those
claimants, the path of awards of a rule S is the graph of all possible allocations
awarded by S as E varies from 0 to the sum of claims. See Figure 1.
Alternatively, a problem (c, E) can be interpreted as a cost-sharing problem or a
taxation problem. Under the cost sharing interpretation, c is the vector of benefits
each individual will receive from the shared project and E is the cost of the project.
The restriction E ≤ ∑N ci means that the project is socially beneficial. Under the
taxation problem interpretation, c is the vector of incomes and E is the total tax to
be raised.
2.2 Examples of Division Rules
The following are simple examples of division rules. Figure 2 illustrates the paths of
awards for each of these division rules.
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Figure 1: Path of awards. The horizontal axis measures claimant 1’s claim and
award. The vertical axis measures claimant 2’s. The path of awards is the set of all
awards as E varies.
• The Proportional Rule. For (c, E) ∈ C, and i ∈ N ,
Pi (c, E) ≡ λci,
where λ is chosen so that
∑
N Pj (c, E) = E. (Note that λ = Eupslope
∑
N cj.) P
gives to each claimant the same proportion of his respective claim. For example,
if there is only enough of the endowment to cover half of the total claims, then
P will give each claimant half of his claim.
• The Constrained Equal Awards Rule. For (c, E) ∈ C, and i ∈ N ,
CEAi (c, E) ≡ min {ci, λ}
where λ is chosen so that
∑
N CEAj (c, E) = E. CEA gives to each claimant
the same award, with the exception of those claimants who would otherwise
receive more than their respective claims.
• The Constrained Equal Losses Rule. For (c, E) ∈ C, and i ∈ N ,
CELi (c, E) ≡ max {0, ci − λ} ,
where λ is chosen so that
∑
N CELj (c, E) = E. CEL equalizes losses (i.e. the
difference between an agent’s claim and his award) across claimants, with the
exception of those claimants who would otherwise receive a negative award.
• The Dictatorial Rule with priority  (where  is a strict linear order over N).
For (c, E) ∈ C, and i ∈ N ,
Dici (c, E) ≡

ci, if i  λ
E −∑j∈N :ji cj, if i = λ
0, if λ  i
,
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Figure 2: Example paths of awards. The paths of awards for (a) P , (b) CEA,
(c) CEL, and (d) Dic12.
where λ ∈ N is chosen so that ∑N Dicj (c, E) = E. Dic distributes the
endowment by lining up the claimants according to , and then going down the
line and giving each claimant his full claim until the endowment is exhausted.
2.3 Asymmetric Parametric Division Rules
We characterize a family of division rules that we call asymmetric parametric rules.
To understand this family, consider again the examples above. In each case, the award
given to a claimant is determined by his claim ci and a parameter λ. For a given
problem, a common parameter is chosen for all claimants so that the sum of awards
equals the endowment.
Formally, let F be the family of functions f : N × R++ × [a, b] → R+, where
−∞ ≤ a < b ≤ ∞, such that (a) f is weakly increasing in the third argument, (b) f
is continuous in the third argument, and (c) for every i ∈ N and c0 ∈ R++ we have
fi (c0, a) = 0 and fi (c0, b) = c0. Observe that for any f ∈ F and for any problem
(c, E) ∈ C, ∑N fi (ci, ·) is continuous and weakly increasing. So by the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists λ ∈ [a, b] such that ∑N fi (ci, λ) = E. Moreover, if λ′
is such that
∑
N fi (ci, λ
′) = E as well, then for every i ∈ N , fi (ci, λ′) = fi (ci, λ).
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Figure 3: Parametric functions. An asymmetric parametric division rule would
divide E between i and j (when their respective claims are ci and cj) by finding λ
such that fi (ci, λ) + fj (cj, λ) = E.
Hence, for any f ∈ F , we can define a division rule Sf as follows. For (c, E) ∈ C, and
i ∈ N ,
Sfi (c, E) ≡ fi (ci, λ) , (1)
where λ is chosen so that
∑
N fi (ci, λ) = E. We say a rule S has a(n) (asymmetric)
parametric representation f if f ∈ F and if for every (c, E) ∈ C, there exists λ ∈ [a, b]
such that for every i ∈ N , Si (c, E) = fi (ci, λ). We say such a representation is
continuous if f is continuous. See Figure 3.
A special case is a rule that has a parametric representation f = {f0}, i.e. where
fi = fj for every i, j ∈ N. We say S has a symmetric parametric representation f0
if {f0} ∈ F is a parametric representation of S. Such rules were characterized by
Young (1987), and we discuss his axioms in Section 3.
Of our examples above, P , CEA, and CEL all have symmetric parametric rep-
resentations, while Dic has an asymmetric parametric representation. Figure 4
illustrates their respective parametric representations.
For P ,
f0 (ci, λ) = λci
is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b = 1. For CEA, the function
f0 (ci, λ) = min {ci, λ}
is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b =∞. For CEL, the function
f0 (ci, λ) = max {0, ci + λ}
is a parametric representation where a = −∞ and b = 0. For Dic where  is the
“strictly less than” relation <, the collection of functions
fi (ci, λ) =

0, λ < i− 1
(1 + λ− i) ci, i− 1 ≤ λ < i
ci, λ ≥ i
is a parametric representation where a = 0 and b =∞.
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Figure 4: Example parametric representations. Parametric representations of
(a) P , (b) CEA, (c) CEL, and (d) Dic<.
3 Main Approach
Our main approach at characterizing the asymmetric parametric family of rules uses
the standard definition of a problem given above in Section 2. As asymmetric para-
metric rules are a generalization of Young’s (1987) parametric rules, we first introduce
the axioms used by Young.
3.1 Young (1987)
One of the most important axioms studied in the literature is Consistency, which
deals with how the rule allocates when the group of claimants shrinks.
Consistency. For every (c, E) ∈ C, if N ′ ⊂ N , then
SN ′ (c, E) = S (cN ′ ,
∑
N ′ Si (c, E)) .
A slightly weaker version is Bilateral Consistency, which is Consistency applied
only to two-person subgroups N ′.
To understand Consistency, consider the following. Suppose a rule chooses an
allocation for a problem. Some claimants are given their respective awards and leave.
Suppose now the rule is asked to reconsider its original allocation for those claimants
who remain. That is, the rule is given the opportunity to reallocate what remains of
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the endowment between the claimants who have not yet received their awards.2 The
rule can choose to distribute according to the original allocation, or it can choose a
new allocation. What Consistency says is that the rule will always choose the original
allocation. All of the examples given above are consistent, though it would not be
difficult to construct a rule that is not. For example, a rule that distributed according
to CEA when there are three claimants and CEL when there are two claimants would
not satisfy Consistency.
Symmetry. For every (c, E) ∈ C and {i, j} ⊂ N , if ci = cj, then Si (c, E) =
Sj (c, E).
This states that if two agents have the same claim, then they will get the same
award. Of the examples above, Dic is not symmetric.
Continuity. For every (c, E) ∈ C, for every sequence of problems {(ck, Ek)} in CN ,
if
(
ck, Ek
)→ (c, E), then S (ck, Ek)→ S (c, E).
Young’s Theorem states that a division rule has a continuous symmetric para-
metric representation if and only if it satisfies Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and
Symmetry. An important step in the proof is showing that these three axioms imply
the following.
Resource Monotonicity. For every (c, E) , (c, E ′) ∈ C, if E < E ′, then for every
i ∈ N , Si (c, E) ≤ Si (c, E ′).
Resource Monotonicity states that if the endowment increases, no claimant should
get a smaller award. A stronger version is Strict Resource Monotonicity, the only
difference being a strict rather than weak inequality in the statement of the axiom.
All of the examples given above are resource monotonic, though it would not be
difficult to construct a rule that is not.
3.2 Intrapersonal Consistency
We motivate our first novel axiom with the following example, which illustrates that
simply dropping Symmetry from Young’s theorem is not enough to characterize asym-
metric parametric rules.
Example 1 We construct a continuous, consistent, and resource monotonic rule
that does not have an asymmetric parametric representation. First, consider the
following two-person rule, S ′. Fix c1, c′1, c2, and c
′
2 where c1 < c
′
1 and c2 < c
′
2.
Let S ′ be continuous and satisfy S ′ ((c1, c2) , c1) = (c1, 0), S ′ ((c′1, c2) , c2) = (0, c2),
S ′ ((c1, c′2) , c
′
2) = (0, c
′
2), and S
′ ((c′1, c
′
2) , c
′
1) = (c
′
1, 0).
3 Figure 5 illustrates the paths
of awards for this rule.
Hence, if claims are either (c1, c2) or (c
′
1, c
′
2) then S
′ gives priority to claimant 1
over claimant 2. If claims are either (c′1, c2) or (c1, c
′
2) then S
′ gives priority to 2 over
2This is also a claims problem since
∑
N ′ Si (c, E) ≤
∑
N ′ ci for every N
′ ⊂ N .
3It is not hard to see that such a continuous rule exists since we have only specified a finite
number of values for S′.
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Figure 5: Path of awards for Example 1. Panel (a) shows that when 1 has claim
c1 and 2 has claim c2, then 1 is given priority over 2. Panel (b) shows that when 1
has a claim of c′1 and 2 has a claim of c2, then 2 is given priority over 1. Etc.
1. For any other two-person problem, S ′ can assign any solution (as long as S ′ is
continuous).
Now we extend S ′ to a rule defined over any problem, not just two-person problems.
We call this extension S. First, for any problem where 1, 2 6∈ N , then S = Par, where
Par is any parametric rule (e.g. the Proportional rule). For any other problem (where
1 ∈ N , 2 ∈ N , or 1, 2 ∈ N), S divides the endowment by first satisfying the claims
of claimants 1 and 2, dividing between them according to S ′ if 1, 2 ∈ N , and then
allocating the remainder of the endowment to the rest of the claimants according to
Par. It is not hard to show that S is continuous, consistent, and resource monotonic,
but not symmetric.
Now we show that there is no asymmetric parametric representation of S. If there
were, then panel (a) of Figure 5 would imply that there exist λ < λ′ such that f1 (c1, ·)
is weakly increasing on [λ, λ′], f1 (c1, λ) = 0, f1 (c1, λ′) = c1, and where f2 (c2, ·) is
zero on [λ, λ′]. Similarly, panel (b) would imply that there exists λ′′ > λ′ such that
f2 (c2, ·) is weakly increasing on [λ′, λ′′], f2 (c2, λ′′) = c2, and where f1 (c′1, ·) is zero on
[λ, λ′′]. Panel (d) would imply that there exists λ′′′ > λ′′ such that f1 (c′1, ·) is weakly
increasing on [λ′′, λ′′′], f1 (c′1, λ
′′′) = c′1, and where f2 (c
′
2, ·) is zero on [λ, λ′′′]. Finally,
panel (c) would imply that f1 (c1, ·) is zero on [λ, λ′′′], which is a contradiction since
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Figure 6: Illustration of G.
we already showed that f1 (c1, λ
′) = c1.
The key to understanding this example is recognizing that a rule can implicitly
reveal how it allocates between different claims of one claimant. For example, panel
(a) of Figure 5 shows that S gives priority to c1 over c2, while panel (b) shows that S
gives priority to c2 over c
′
1. Hence, S has implicitly revealed that it gives priority to
c1 over c
′
1. However, S fails to have an asymmetric parametric representation because
panels (c) and (d) reveal the opposite: that S gives priority to c′1 over c1. The reason
why Consistency does not preclude such rules is because it has no force with two-
person groups. What is needed is an axiom that requires a rule to be intrapersonally
consistent.
The following definitions will make it easier to formalize this axiom. Define
Y ≡ {(i, ci, xi) : i ∈ N, ci ∈ R++, xi ∈ R+, xi ∈ [0, ci]} .
We think of (i, ci, xi) as describing an agent, his claim, and his award. For a given
rule S, for every (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y , j 6= i, and cj ∈ R++, define the function:
G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≡ inf {E : Si ((ci, cj) , E) ≥ xi} .
Figure 6 illustrates.
Observe that for continuous rules, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) = min {E : Si ((ci, cj) , E) = xi}.
Hence G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) is the smallest endowment needed for S to award xi to agent
i (when i’s and j’s respective claims are ci and cj).
Define the binary relation R1 over Y as follows.
Definition 1 (i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj) if i 6= j and G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci).
Let I1 and P1 denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R1 respectively.
Obviously, (i, ci, xi) I1 (j, cj, xj) if and only if G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) = G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)
and (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj) if and only if G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci).
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We think of R1 as the ranking that the rule gives to different awards; i.e. if
(i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj), then the rule will award xi to agent i before it awards xj to
agent j (when their respective claims are ci and cj). Consider Figure 6 again. As
the endowment increases from 0 to c1 + c2, the amount awarded follows the path of
awards from the origin to (c1, c2). The path crosses the vertical line representing x1
before it crosses the horizontal line representing x2. (Observe that this particular
division rule is not resource monotonic, and so the path of awards crosses x1 multiple
times.) Thus we conclude that the rule awards x1 to 1 before it awards x2 to 2, or
(1, c1, x1)P1 (2, c2, x2).
Intrapersonal Consistency. For every (i, ci, xi) , (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) , (j, cj, xj) ,
(
j, c′j, x
′
j
) ∈ Y
where i 6= j, if
(i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) ,
then it is not true that
(i, c′i, x
′
i)P1
(
j, c′j, x
′
j
)
P1 (i, ci, xi) .
Intrapersonal Consistency is a restriction on how the rule implicitly allocates be-
tween different claims of the same claimant. It states that if the rule (indirectly)
awards xi to the ci-version of i before it awards x
′
i to the c
′
i-version, it will never
award x′i to the c
′
i-version before it awards xi to the ci-version.
4
To understand how Intrapersonal Consistency relates to Consistency, consider the
following variation.
Alternative to Consistency. For every (i, ci, xi) , (j, cj, xj) , (k, ck, xk) , (l, cl, xl) ∈
Y where i, j, and k are distinct, if
(i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj)P1 (k, ck, xk) ,
then it is not true that
(k, ck, xk)P1 (l, cl, xl)P1 (i, ci, xi) .
This alternative to Consistency concerns interpersonal comparisons, as opposed
to the intrapersonal comparisons in Intrapersonal Consistency. One can show that
Consistency implies the above alternative.5 Conversely, one could replace Consistency
4Though stated as a restriction on the ordering R1, Intrapersonal Consistency is a restriction on
division rules since R1 is defined from S. The statement of the axiom purely in terms of (continuous)
division rules is as follows: For every {i, j} ⊂ N, ci, c′i, cj , c′j ∈ R++, and E,E′, Eˆ, Eˆ′ ∈ R+, if
S ((ci, cj) , E) = (xi, xj) ,
S ((c′i, cj) , E
′) =
(
x′i, x
′
j
)
,
S
((
ci, c
′
j
)
, Eˆ
)
= (xi, xˆj) ,
S
((
c′i, c
′
j
)
, Eˆ′
)
=
(
x′i, xˆ
′
j
)
,
E = G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj), E
′ = G ((i, ci, x′i) , j, cj), Eˆ = G
(
(i, ci, xi) , j, c
′
j
)
, Eˆ′ = G
(
(i, ci, x
′
i) , j, c
′
j
)
,
and xj < x
′
j , then xˆj ≤ xˆ′j .
5This is essentially shown in the first case in the proof of Lemma 10.
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with the above alternative in Theorem 1 and the result would still hold.
We now formalize the implicit intrapersonal ranking of a rule. Define the binary
relation R2 over Y as follows.
Definition 2 (i, ci, xi)R2 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) if there exists (j, cj, xj) ∈ Y where j 6= i such that
(i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj)R1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i).
Let I2 and P2 denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of R2 respectively.
Define the binary relation C over Y as follows.
Definition 3 (i, ci, xi)C (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) if either (i, ci, xi)R2 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) or (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)R2 (i, ci, xi).
So we interpret C to be the “comparable” relation. That is, (i, ci, xi) and (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)
are comparable if there exists some (j, cj, xj) that separates them. However it may
be that such a (j, cj, xj) does not exist, in which case (i, ci, xi) and (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) would
not be comparable. Let NC denote the “not comparable” relation.
3.3 Non-comparability Continuity in Claims at Priority Points
Our final axiom concerns when two elements of Y should not be comparable. To
motivate this axiom, consider the following example.
Example 2 We construct a rule that is continuous, consistent, intrapersonally con-
sistent, and resource monotonic, but which does not have an asymmetric parametric
representation. For i 6= 1, let fi (c0, λ) = λc0 be i’s parametric function on [0, 1]. For
i = 1, f1 is not a function, but rather a correspondence on [0, 1], defined by
f1 (c0, λ) =

0, for λ < c0
1+c0
[0, c0] for λ =
c0
1+c0
c0, for λ >
c0
1+c0
.
So for every c0, f1 (c0, ·) is a step correspondence where c01+c0 is the location of the
step and c0 is its height. Figure 7 illustrates f1.
Observe that for any (c, E) ∈ C, there exists a unique λ such that E ∈∑i∈N fi (ci, λ).
So define a division rule Sf as follows. For any (c, E), for i 6= 1,
Sfi (c, E) ≡ fi (ci, λ) ,
and for i = 1,
Sf1 (c, E) ≡ E −
∑
i∈N\{1}
Sfi ,
where λ is chosen so that E ∈ ∑i∈N fi (ci, λ). (Hence, Sf1 (c, E) ∈ f1 (c1, λ).) One
can show that Sf is continuous, consistent, intrapersonally consistent, and resource
monotonic.
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Figure 7: “Parametric” representation for Example 2. f1 is a collection of
step correspondences. Two examples are given: f1 (c1, ·) and f1 (c′1, ·).
We claim that Sf does not have an asymmetric parametric representation. Suppose
it does have a representation, fˆ . For every c1 > 0, set
m (c1) ≡ sup
{
λ ∈ [a, b] : fˆ1 (c1, λ) = 0
}
and
M (c1) ≡ inf
{
λ ∈ [a, b] : fˆ1 (c1, λ) = c1
}
.
Hence, [m (c1) ,M (c1)] is the smallest subinterval of [a, b] such that the range of
fˆ1 (c1, ·) is [0, c1]. Since fˆ1 is continuous in the second argument, m (c1) < M (c1) for
every c1 > 0. By definition of S
f , if c1 < c
′
1, then M (c1) < m (c
′
1). (This is because
for claimant 1, Sf gives priority to smaller claims.) Hence, {[m (c1) ,M (c1)] : c1 > 0}
is an uncountable collection of disjoint, nonempty, non-singleton subintervals of [a, b],
which is impossible.
Before stating the axiom, we need a definition.
Definition 4 The rule S gives priority to (i, ci, xi) if 0 < xi < ci and if there
exists  > 0 such that for every (cˆ, E) where i ∈ N , cˆi = ci, and Si (cˆ, E) = xi, for
every a ∈ (−, ),
Si (cˆ, E + a) = xi + a.
Non-comparability Continuity in Claims at Priority Points. If S gives pri-
ority to (i, ci, xi), then there exists  > 0 such that for every c
′
i ∈ (ci − , ci + ),
(i, c′i, xi)NC (i, ci, xi).
We will refer to this axiom as N-Continuity. If S gives priority to (i, ci, xi), then
small perturbations of xi will not be comparable to (i, ci, xi). N-Continuity states
that if such is the case, then small perturbations of ci will also not be comparable to
(i, ci, xi).
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3.4 Characterizations and Independence of Axioms
We now state the main theorem.
Theorem 1 Let S be a division rule over C. Then S has a continuous asymmetric
parametric representation if and only if S satisfies Continuity, N-Continuity, Bilateral
Consistency, Intrapersonal Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity.
Proof. See A.
The following examples demonstrate the independence of the respective axiom.
(Verification that the following division rules satisfy all the axioms but the one stated
is left to the reader.)
• Continuity. A division rule that satisfies all the axioms but Continuity is as
follows. Let f ∈ F be such that fi is strictly increasing in λ but not jointly
continuous for every i. Define S according to (1). Then S is not continuous.
However, since fi is strictly increasing in λ for every i, there is no (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y
such that S gives priority to (i, ci, xi). So N-Continuity is satisfied vacuously.
The other axioms can be easily verified.
• N-Continuity. Example 2 satisfies all the axioms but N-Continuity.
• Consistency. A division rule which allocates according to P for two-person
groups, but CEA for groups larger than two, would satisfy all the axioms but
Consistency.
• Intrapersonal Consistency. In Example 1, choose S ′ so that there exists c∗1 such
that any two-person problem where claimant 1’s claim is c∗1 is strictly resource
monotonic. Also, choose S ′ so that there exists c∗2 such that any two-person
problem where claimant 2’s claim is c∗2 is strictly resource monotonic. (These
extra conditions are needed to assure that there is no (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y such that S
gives priority to (i, ci, xi).) Extend S
′ to a division rule S over arbitrary groups
as in Example 1. Then S satisfies all the axioms but Intrapersonal Consistency.
It is an open question whether Resource Monotonicity is independent of the other
axioms.
If Resource Monotonicity is strengthened to Strict Resource Monotonicity, then
the asymmetric parametric representation is strictly increasing in the parameter.
However, it is interesting to note that for strictly resource monotonic rules, the axioms
Intrapersonal Consistency and N-Continuity are not needed for the characterization.
Theorem 2 Let S be a division rule over C. Then S has a continuous asymmetric
parametric representation with strictly increasing parametric functions if and only if
S satisfies Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Strict Resource Monotonicity.
Proof. See B.
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4 An Alternative Approach
In this section we provide an alternative characterization of the family of asymmetric
parametric rules by expanding the definition of a problem to allow claimants to have
multiple claims. Hence, division rules defined on this domain can allocate intraper-
sonally.
An expanded claims problem is a tuple (N,m, c, E) where N ⊂ N is a finite
group of claimants, m = (mi)i∈N ∈ NN is the vector of identities of the claimants,
c = (ci)i∈N ∈ RN++ is the vector of their claims, and E ∈ R+ is the endowment to
be divided, all satisfying E ≤ ∑i∈N ci. Let K denote the set of expanded problems.
For a fixed group N , let KN denote the set of expanded problems for N . We will
typically write an expanded problem as (m, c,E) ∈ K where it is assumed that the
group of claimants is N . Also, we will typically use a hat symbol to denote division
rules defined over K, such as Sˆ.
The main difference between a classic problem and an expanded problem is how a
claimant’s identity is modeled. In a classic problem, i ∈ N represents the identity of
a claimant. In an expanded problem, i ∈ N simply enumerates a claimant (we refer
to i as the claimant’s “number”), while mi represents the identity of the i
th claimant.
Hence, if mi = mj, then we interpret this to mean that the same individual is in the
expanded problem twice, something which is precluded in a classic problem. Observe
that we can identify any classic problem in C with an expanded problem in K. That
is, for (c, E) ∈ C, then (m, c,E) ∈ K where mi = i for every i ∈ N . Thus we can
imbed C in K.
Continuity and Consistency are easily adapted to rules over K.
Continuity. For every (m, c,E) ∈ K, for every sequence of problems {(m, ck, Ek)}
in KN , if (m, ck, Ek)→ (m, c,E), then Sˆ (m, ck, Ek)→ Sˆ (m, c,E).
Consistency. For every (m, c,E) ∈ K, if N ′ ⊂ N , then
SˆN ′ (m, c,E) = Sˆ
(
mN ′ , cN ′ ,
∑
N ′
Sˆi (m, c,E)
)
.
Bilateral Consistency is the same as before. We also assume Symmetry.
Symmetry. For every (m, c,E) ∈ K and {i, j} ⊂ N , if mi = mj and ci = cj, then
Sˆi (m, c,E) = Sˆj (m, c,E).
Here, Symmetry avoids the objections given in the introduction because different
claimants with the same claim can receive different awards. It is only to “clones”
(i.e. claimants with the same identity and claim) that the division rule must give the
same award.
For any f ∈ F , we can define a division rule Sˆf over K as follows. For every
i ∈ N ,
Sˆfi (m, c,E) ≡ fmi (ci, λ) , (2)
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where λ is chosen so that
∑
i∈N fmi (ci, λ) = E. We say a rule Sˆ has an asymmetric
parametric representation f ∈ F if for every (m, c,E) ∈ C, there exists λ ∈ [a, b] such
that for every i ∈ N , Sˆi (m, c,E) = fmi (ci, λ).
Theorem 3 Let Sˆ be a division rule over K. Then Sˆ has a continuous asymmetric
parametric representation if and only if Sˆ satisfies Continuity, Bilateral Consistency,
and Symmetry.
Theorem 3 is actually a special case of a result from Kaminski (2006, Theorem
1). In that paper, a claims problem is an object (t, E) ∈ T × R++, where T is a
separable topological space that represents possible “types” for the claimants. Both
the classic problem (where T = R++) and the expanded problem (where T = N×R++)
are special cases. Kaminski’s main result characterizes parametric division rules in
this setting using Continuity, Bilateral Consistency, and Symmetry. Thus, Young’s
Theorem is a special case when T = R++ and Theorem 3 is a special case when
T = N× R++.
Even though Theorem 3 follows formally from Kaminski’s theorem, there is a
conceptual difference between the two. Kaminski interprets a claimant’s type to
contain “non-personal information essential for the rationing problem” (p. 117).
That is, a claimant’s identity cannot be part of his type. However this restriction is
merely an interpretation of the formal model, and is not relevant to the validity of
Theorem 3.
But this interpretation is relevant to applications of Kaminski’s theorem. Specif-
ically, Kaminski (2006, pp.126-9) uses the US bankruptcy rule as an example of his
family of parametric rules. In this example, part of the type space describes how
much federal taxes is owed to each claimant. This is contrary to the assumption that
types contain non-personal information since only one claimant can be the federal
government. Thus any rule defined on this type space must be able to make direct
intrapersonal allocations (between different versions of the federal government). The
example can be modified to disallow direct intrapersonal allocation, but then Symme-
try could not be assumed because the federal government is given priority over other
claimants. One would need to impose appropriate modifications of Intrapersonal
Consistency and N-Continuity to get an asymmetric result in this domain similar to
that of Theorem 1.
5 Equivalence of the Two Approaches
In this section, we show that the two approaches used to characterize the family
of asymmetric parametric rules are essentially equivalent. This is actually a simple
exercise. This is because the family of parametric functions F used to define an
asymmetric parametric rule is the same in the two approaches.
Recall from Section 4 that we can identify any classic problem in C with an
expanded problem in K with the mapping (c, E) 7→ (m, c,E), where mi = i for every
i ∈ N . Thus we think of K as a larger set of problems that contains C. For any
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division rule Sˆ over K, we can define a division rule S over C by looking at how Sˆ
divides over C. That is:
S (c, E) ≡ Sˆ (m, c,E) (3)
where mi = i for every i ∈ N . The following result shows that (3) maps continuous
asymmetric parametric rules defined over K to continuous asymmetric parametric
rules over C.
Theorem 4 Let Sˆ be a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over K. Let S be
a division rule over C defined from Sˆ by (3). Then S is a continuous asymmetric
parametric rule.
Proof. Let f ∈ F be a continuous representation of Sˆ. It is obvious that f also
represents S. Hence, S is a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over C.
Now we go the other direction by showing that any continuous asymmetric para-
metric rule over C can be extended to a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over
K.
Definition 5 Let S be a division rule over C and let Sˆ be a division rule over K. We
say S and Sˆ agree on C if for every (c, E) ∈ C, S (c, E) = Sˆ (m, c,E) where mi = i
for every i ∈ N . We say Sˆ is an extension of S over K.
Theorem 5 Let S be a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over C. Then there
exists a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S over K. Moreover, if Sˆ is
a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S over K, then there exists f ∈ F
continuous that represents both S and Sˆ.
Proof. Let f ∈ F be a continuous representation of S. Define Sˆf according to (2).
It is obvious that Sˆf is a continuous asymmetric parametric rule over K and that S
and Sˆf agree on C.
Now let Sˆ be a continuous asymmetric parametric extension of S to K. Let f ∈ F
be a continuous representation of Sˆ. Since S and Sˆ agree on C, it is obvious that f
is a continuous representation of S.
6 Conclusion
We used two approaches to characterize the family of asymmetric parametric divi-
sion rules. The key to understanding the difference between these two approaches
is in recognizing that an asymmetric parametric rule has the potential to allocate
intrapersonally. In the first approach, intrapersonal allocation is precluded by defi-
nition. Thus how a rule allocates intrapersonally can only be inferred by how a rule
allocates interpersonally. In the second approach, intrapersonal allocation is explic-
itly allowed. The second approach has the advantage of using simpler, well-known
axioms. However, the domain is arguably unrealistic, and it obscures the properties
that asymmetric parametric rules satisfy under the domain of classic problems. The
advantage of the first approach is that it makes explicit these properties, even though
these properties are admittedly not as easy to understand.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Verifying that the axioms are necessary is a straightforward exercise. We show now
that the axioms are sufficient. The proof proceeds as follows. We define a complete
and transitive binary relation R over Y . We show that there exists a countable R-
dense subset of Y , implying that R has a numerical representation. Taking the inverse
of this representation gives us our parametric functions. The proof is concluded by
showing these functions satisfy the necessary properties.
Set
m (i, ci, xi) ≡ inf {x′i ≤ xi : (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, ci, xi)}
and
M (i, ci, xi) ≡ sup {x′i ≥ xi : (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, ci, xi)}
and
θ (i, ci, xi) ≡
{
0, if m (i, ci, xi) = M (i, ci, xi)
xi−m(i,ci,xi)
M(i,ci,xi)−m(i,ci,xi) if m (i, ci, xi) < M (i, ci, xi)
.
When they are well-defined, m (i, ci, xi) ≤ xi ≤M (i, ci, xi) and 0 ≤ θ (i, ci, xi) ≤ 1.
Lemma 1 If (i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
′
i, x
′
i), then m (i, ci, xi), M (i, ci, xi), and θ (i, ci, xi) are
well-defined.
Proof. If (i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
′
i, x
′
i), then there exists no (j, cj, xj) such that (i, ci, xi) I1 (j, cj, xj).
Hence (i, ci, xi)NC (i, ci, xi), which implies
xi ∈ {x′i ≤ xi : (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, ci, xi)}
and
xi ∈ {x′i ≥ xi : (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, ci, xi)} .
Define the binary relation R3 over Y as follows.
(i, ci, xi)R3 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) if (i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) and θ (i, ci, xi) ≤ θ (i, c′i, x′i) .
Define R ≡ R1 ∪R2 ∪R3.
Lemma 2 R is complete.
Proof. For every (i, ci, xi) and (j, cj, xj), either (i) i 6= j, (ii) i = j and (i, ci, xi)C
(j, cj, xj), or (iii) i = j and (i, ci, xi)NC (j, cj, xj). If (i), then eitherG ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤
G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci) or G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≥ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci). If (ii), then (i, ci, xi)C
(j, cj, xj) implies either (i, ci, xi)R2 (j, cj, xj) or (j, cj, xj)R2 (i, ci, xi). If (iii), then
either θ (i, ci, xi) ≤ θ (j, cj, xj) or θ (i, ci, xi) ≥ θ (j, cj, xj).
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A.1 R Is Transitive
Lemma 3 For every (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y , j 6= i, and cj ∈ R++, Si ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)) =
xi.
Proof. This follows directly from Continuity.
Lemma 4 For every i, j, k distinct, for every ci, cj, ck ∈ R++, for every xi ∈ [0, ci],
there exists E such that
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E) = (xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi) .
Proof. Set E ≡ G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) + G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck) − xi and
(
x′i, x
′
j, x
′
k
) ≡
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E). Hence,
x′i + x
′
j + x
′
k = G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) +G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi. (4)
Claim: x′i = xi. Suppose x
′
i < xi. Observe that Bilateral Consistency implies
S
(
(ci, cj) , x
′
i + x
′
j
)
=
(
x′i, x
′
j
)
and S ((ci, ck) , x
′
i + x
′
k) = (x
′
i, x
′
k). Also, by Lemma 3,
S ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)) = (xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi)
and
S ((ci, ck) , G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)) = (xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi) .
Since x′i < xi, Resource Monotonicity implies x
′
j ≤ G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) − xi and x′k ≤
G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)−xi. Hence, x′i+x′j+x′k < G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)+G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)−
xi, which contradicts equation (4). The proof is similar if x
′
i > xi. Hence x
′
i = xi.
Claim: x′j = G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)−xi and x′k = G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)−xi. By definition
of G, xi + x
′
j ≥ G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) and xi + x′k ≥ G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck). If either of these
inequalities are strict, then xi+x
′
j +x
′
k > G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) +G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)−xi,
which contradicts equation (4). Hence, xi + x
′
j = G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) and xi + x
′
k =
G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck).
Lemma 5 (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj) if and only if xi + xj > G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj).
Proof. By Lemma 3,
S ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)) = (xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi)
and
S ((ci, cj) , G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)) = (G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)− xj, xj) .
(⇒) So G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci). Resource Monotonicity implies
G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi ≤ xj. If G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi = xj, then
S ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)) = (xi, xj) .
But this would imply G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≥ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci) by definition of G, a
contradiction. Hence, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi < xj.
(⇐) Suppose xj > G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) − xi. Then Resource Monotonicity implies
G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci), or (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj).
Observe that an alternative statement of Lemma 5 is (i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj) if and
only if xi + xj ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci).
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Lemma 6 If (i, ci, xi)NC (i, ci, x
′
i), then m (i, ci, xi) = m (i, ci, x
′
i) and M (i, ci, xi) =
M (i, ci, x
′
i).
Proof. Follows immediately from transitivity of NC.
Lemma 7 (i, ci, xi)R (i, ci, x
′
i) if and only if xi ≤ x′i.
Proof. Case 1: (i, ci, xi)C
(
i, ci, x
′
i
)
.
So there exists (j, cj, xj) such that
(i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj)R1 (i, ci, x
′
i) .
This is true if and only if G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci) ≤ G ((i, ci, x′i) , j, cj).
But Resource Monotonicity implies G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤ G ((i, ci, x′i) , j, cj) if and only
if xi ≤ x′i.
Case 2: (i, ci, xi)NC
(
i, ci, x
′
i
)
.
By Lemma 6, m (i, ci, xi) = m (i, ci, x
′
i) andM (i, ci, xi) = M (i, ci, x
′
i). Ifm (i, ci, xi) =
M (i, ci, xi), then 0 = θ (i, ci, xi) = θ (i, ci, x
′
i) and m (i, ci, xi) = M (i, ci, xi) = xi = x
′
i.
If m (i, ci, xi) < M (i, ci, xi), then the definition of θ implies θ (i, ci, xi) ≤ θ (i, ci, x′i) if
and only if xi ≤ x′i.
Lemma 8 If i 6= j and (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj), then there exists  > 0 such that for
every x′j ∈ (xj − , xj),
(i, ci, xi)P1
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P (j, cj, xj) .
Proof. By Lemma 5, (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj) implies xi + xj > G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj). Set
 ≡ xi + xj −G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) .
Then for x′j ∈ (xj − , xj), xi + x′j > G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj). So (i, ci, xi)P1
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
by
Lemma 5, while
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P (j, cj, xj) by Lemma 7.
Lemma 9 If i 6= j and (i, ci, xi)P (i, ci, x′i)R1 (j, cj, xj), then (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj).
Proof. Suppose (j, cj, xj)R1 (i, ci, xi). Then by definition, (i, ci, x
′
i)R2 (i, ci, xi).
Lemma 7 implies x′i ≤ xi. But (i, ci, xi)P (i, ci, x′i) and Lemma 7 imply xi < x′i,
a contradiction.
Lemma 10 R is transitive.
Proof. Suppose (i, ci, xi)R (j, cj, xj)R (k, ck, xk).
Case 1: i, j, k distinct.
By Lemma 4, there exists E, E ′, and E ′′ such that
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E) = (xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi, G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi) ,
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E
′) = (G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)− xj, xj, G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj) ,
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E
′′) = (G ((k, ck, xk) , i, ci)− xk, G ((k, ck, xk) , j, cj)− xk, xk) .
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Claim: E ≤ E ′. If E > E ′, then Resource Monotonicity implies
xi ≥ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)− xj,
xj ≤ G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi,
and
G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj ≤ G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi,
with one of these strict. But G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci). Hence xi =
G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci)− xj and xj = G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)− xi, which implies
G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj < G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck)− xi (5)
and
S ((ci, cj, ck) , E
′) = (xi, xj, G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj) .
Bilateral Consistency implies
S ((ci, ck) , xi +G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj) = (xi, G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj) .
By definition, G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck) ≤ xi +G ((j, cj, xj) , k, ck)− xj. But this contradicts
inequality (5).
Similarly, E ′ ≤ E ′′. Hence, E ≤ E ′′. Resource Monotonicity implies xi ≤
G ((k, ck, xk) , i, ci) − xk and G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck) − xi ≤ xk. So G ((i, ci, xi) , k, ck) ≤
G ((k, ck, xk) , i, ci), so (i, ci, xi)R1 (k, ck, xk) by definition.
Case 2: i = k 6= j.
Then (i, ci, xi)R2 (k, ck, xk) by definition.
Case 3: i = j 6= k. So let (i, ci, xi)R (i, c′i, x′i)R1 (k, ck, xk).
3.1: (i, ci, xi)C
(
i, c′i, x
′
i
)
.
Then there exists (j′, cj′ , xj′) where j′ 6= i such that
(i, ci, xi)R1 (j
′, cj′ , xj′)R1 (i, c′i, x
′
i)R1 (k, ck, xk) .
If j′ 6= k, then Case 1 (applied twice) implies (i, ci, xi)R1 (k, ck, xk).
If j′ = k, then
(i, ci, xi)R1 (k, c
′
k, x
′
k)R1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)R1 (k, ck, xk) .
Suppose (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, ci, xi). By Lemmas 8 and 9, there exists xˆi, xˆ
′
k, and xˆ
′
i such
that
(k, ck, xk)P1 (i, ci, xˆi)P1 (k, c
′
k, xˆ
′
k)P1 (i, c
′
i, xˆ
′
i)P1 (k, ck, xk) .
But this contradicts Intrapersonal Consistency. Hence (i, ci, xi)R1 (k, ck, xk).
3.2: (i, ci, xi)NC
(
i, c′i, x
′
i
)
.
If (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, ci, xi), then (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)R2 (i, ci, xi) by definition. This contradicts
(i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
′
i, x
′
i).
Case 4: i 6= j = k.
Similar to Case 3.
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Case 5: i = j = k. So let (i, ci, xi)R (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)R (i, c
′′
i , x
′′
i ).
5.1: (i, ci, xi)C
(
i, c′i, x
′
i
)
.
Then there exists (j′, cj′ , xj′) where j′ 6= i such that (i, ci, xi)R1 (j′, cj′ , xj′)R1 (i, c′i, x′i).
By Case 4, (j′, cj′ , xj′)R (i, c′′i , x
′′
i ). By Case 2, (i, ci, xi)R (i, c
′′
i , x
′′
i ).
5.2:
(
i, c′i, x
′
i
)
C
(
i, c′′i , x
′′
i
)
.
Then there exists (j′, cj′ , xj′) where j′ 6= i such that (i, c′i, x′i)R1 (j′, cj′ , xj′)R1 (i, c′′i , x′′i ).
By Case 3, (i, ci, xi)R (j
′, cj′ , xj′). By Case 2, (i, ci, xi)R (i, c′′i , x
′′
i ).
5.3: (i, ci, xi)NC
(
i, c′i, x
′
i
)
NC
(
i, c′′i , x
′′
i
)
.
Then (i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
′′
i , x
′′
i ) by the transitivity ofNC. Also θ (i, ci, xi) ≤ θ (i, c′i, x′i) ≤
θ (i, c′′i , x
′′
i ). Hence (i, ci, xi)R3 (i, c
′′
i , x
′′
i ).
A.2 Countable R-dense Subset
Lemma 11 If (i, ci, xi)P (i, cˆi, xˆi), then there exists  > 0 such that for every xˆ
′
i ∈
(xˆi − , xˆi),
(i, ci, xi)P (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i)P (i, cˆi, xˆi) .
Proof. Case 1: (i, ci, xi)C (i, cˆi, xˆi).
Then there exists (k, ck, xk) where k 6= i such that (i, ci, xi)R1 (k, ck, xk)R1 (i, cˆi, xˆi),
where one of these is strict. By Lemma 8, we can assume without loss of generality
that
(i, ci, xi)R1 (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, cˆi, xˆi) .
Also by Lemma 8, there exists  > 0 such that for every xˆ′i ∈ (xˆi − , xˆi),
(k, ck, xk)P1 (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i)P (i, cˆi, xˆi) .
Transitivity of R implies (i, ci, xi)P (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i)P (i, cˆi, xˆi) for any such xˆ
′
i.
Case 2: (i, ci, xi)NC (i, cˆi, xˆi).
So (i, ci, xi)P3 (i, cˆi, xˆi) implies θ (i, ci, xi) < θ (i, cˆi, xˆi). Thus θ (i, cˆi, xˆi) > 0,
which implies m (i, cˆi, xˆi) < xˆi ≤ M (i, cˆi, xˆi). So for every x0 ∈ (m (i, cˆi, xˆi) , xˆi),
(i, cˆi, x0)NC (i, cˆi, xˆi). This implies (i, cˆi, x0)NC (i, ci, xi) for every such x0 since NC
is transitive.
Set
 ≡ xˆi − (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, cˆi, xˆi)− θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, cˆi, xˆi) .
Observe  > 0 since m (i, cˆi, xˆi) < M (i, cˆi, xˆi) and
θ (i, ci, xi) < θ (i, cˆi, xˆi)
=
x′i −m (i, cˆi, xˆi)
M (i, cˆi, xˆi)−m (i, cˆi, xˆi) .
Let xˆ′i ∈ (xˆi − , xˆi). Then by above (i, cˆi, xˆ′i)NC (i, cˆi, xˆi)NC (i, ci, xi). Lemma
6 implies m (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i) = m (i, cˆi, xˆi) and M (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i) = M (i, cˆi, xˆi). Hence
xˆ′i > xˆi − 
= (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, cˆi, xˆi) + θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, cˆi, xˆi)
= (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, cˆi, xˆ′i) + θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, cˆi, xˆ′i)
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which implies
xˆi −m (i, cˆi, xˆ′i)
M (i, cˆi, xˆ′i)−m (i, cˆi, xˆ′i)
> θ (i, ci, xi) ,
or θ (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i) > θ (i, ci, xi). Similarly, one can show θ (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i) < θ (i, cˆi, xˆi). Hence
(i, ci, xi)P3 (i, cˆi, xˆ
′
i)P3 (i, cˆi, xˆi).
Definition 6 The rule S gives left priority to (i, ci, xi) if xi 6= 0 and if there
exists  > 0 such that for every (cˆ, E) where i ∈ N , cˆi = ci, and Si (cˆ, E) = xi, for
every a ∈ (0, ), Si (cˆ, E − a) = xi − a.
Lemma 12 If S gives left priority to (i, ci, xi), then there exists  > 0 such that for
every x′i ∈ (xi − , xi), (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, ci, xi).
Proof. Take  from the definition of left priority. Fix a ∈ (0, ) and (j, cj, xj).
Suppose x′j satisfies S
(
(ci, cj) , xi + x
′
j
)
=
(
xi, x
′
j
)
. Then by the definition of left
priority, for every a′ ∈ (0, ),
S
(
(ci, cj) , xi + x
′
j − a′
)
=
(
xi − a′, x′j
)
,
which impliesG
((
j, cj, x
′
j
)
, i, ci
)
< G ((i, ci, xi − a) , j, cj), or
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P1 (i, ci, xi − a).
Hence if xj ≤ x′j then (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, ci, xi − a) by Lemma 7 and transitivity. However,
if xj > x
′
j, then since S
(
(ci, cj) , xi + x
′
j
)
=
(
xi, x
′
j
)
, it must be thatG ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) <
G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci), or (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj). Hence, (j, cj, xj) cannot separate (i, ci, xi − a)
and (i, ci, xi).
Lemma 13 If S gives left priority to (i, ci, xi), then there exists  > 0 such that for
every cˆi ∈ (ci − , ci + ), there exists xˆi ≤ cˆi such that (i, ci, xi) I3 (i, cˆi, xˆi).
Proof. Since S gives left priority to (i, ci, xi), then Lemma 12 implies that there exists
x′′i < x
′
i < xi such that (i, ci, x
′′
i )NC (i, ci, x
′
i)NC (i, ci, xi). Also, it must be that S
gives priority to (i, ci, x
′′
i ) and (i, ci, x
′
i). Lemma 7 implies θ (i, ci, xi) > θ (i, ci, x
′
i) >
θ (i, ci, x
′′
i ) ≥ 0. N-Continuity implies that there exists  > 0 such that for every
cˆi ∈ (ci − , ci + ), (i, ci, x′′i )NC (i, cˆi, x′′i ) and (i, ci, x′i)NC (i, cˆi, x′i).
Fix cˆi ∈ (ci − , ci + ). Hence (i, cˆi, x′′i )NC (i, cˆi, x′i) by transitivity of NC.
Lemma 6 implies m (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) = m (i, cˆi, x
′
i) and M (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) = M (i, cˆi, x
′
i). Hence
m (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) ≤ x′′i < x′i ≤M (i, cˆi, x′i) implies m (i, cˆi, x′′i ) < M (i, cˆi, x′′i ). Set
xˆi ≡ (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, cˆi, x′′i ) + θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, cˆi, x′′i ) .
Observe m (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) < xˆi ≤M (i, cˆi, x′′i ) since θ (i, ci, xi) > 0.
Claim: (i, cˆi, xˆi)NC (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ). Obviously if xˆi < M (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) then (i, cˆi, xˆi)NC (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ).
So suppose xˆi = M (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) but (i, cˆi, xˆi)C (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ). Observe then that xˆi ≥ x′i > x′′i .
Hence Lemma 7 implies (i, cˆi, x
′′
i )P2 (i, cˆi, xˆi). So there exists (j, cj, xj) such that
(i, cˆi, x
′′
i )R1 (j, cj, xj)R1 (i, cˆi, xˆi), with one of these strict. Lemma 8 implies that
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it is without loss of generality that (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, cˆi, xˆi). But then Lemma 8 im-
plies that there exists x0 < xˆi such that (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, cˆi, x0)P (i, cˆi, xˆi). This im-
plies (i, cˆi, x
′′
i )R1 (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, cˆi, x0) which implies (i, cˆi, x0)C (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ), which im-
plies x0 ≥M (i, cˆi, x′′i ) = xˆi, a contradiction. Hence (i, cˆi, xˆi)NC (i, cˆi, x′′i ).
So by Lemma 6, m (i, cˆi, xˆi) = m (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ) and M (i, cˆi, xˆi) = M (i, cˆi, x
′′
i ). Then
θ (i, cˆi, xˆi) =
xˆi −m (i, cˆi, xˆi)
M (i, cˆi, xˆi)−m (i, cˆi, xˆi)
=
xˆi −m (i, cˆi, x′′i )
M (i, cˆi, x′′i )−m (i, cˆi, x′′i )
= θ (i, ci, xi) .
This implies (i, cˆi, xˆi) I3 (i, ci, xi) since (i, cˆi, xˆi)NC (i, cˆi, x
′′
i )NC (i, ci, x
′′
i )NC (i, ci, xi).
Lemma 14 If (i, ci, xi)P (i, ci, x
′
i)P1 (j, cj, xj), then xi < Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) and
xj > Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj).
Proof. So xi < x
′
i by Lemma 7 and (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj) by transitivity of R. By
Lemma 5, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < xi+xj and x
′
i+xj ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci). Since xi < x′i,
this implies
G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < xi + xj < G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci) .
Hence Resource Monotonicity implies
xi = Si ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj))
≤ Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) .
Observe
Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) + Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) = xi + xj.
So if xi = Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj), then xj = Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj). But then the def-
inition of G implies G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci) ≤ xi + xj, a contradiction. Hence xi <
Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj). This implies xj > Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj).
Lemma 15 If (i, ci, xi)R1 (j, cj, xj), then xi ≤ Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) and xj ≥ Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj).
Proof. By Lemma 5, xi + xj ≤ G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci). Resource Monotonicity implies
xj = Sj ((ci, cj) , G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci))
≥ Sj ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) .
Hence xi ≤ Si ((ci, cj) , xi + xj).
Lemma 16 Y ′ ≡ {(i, ci, xi) : i ∈ N, ci ∈ Q++, xi ∈ Q+, 0 ≤ xi ≤ ci} is a countable R-
dense subset of Y .
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Proof. Obviously, Y ′ is countable. Let (i, ci, xi) , (j, cj, xj) ∈ Y satisfy (i, ci, xi)P (j, cj, xj).
Case 1: S gives left priority to (j, cj, xj).
By Lemma 13, there exists cˆj ∈ Q++ (because Q is dense in R) and xˆj ≤ cˆj such
that (j, cˆj, xˆj) I3 (j, cj, xj). By Lemmas 8 and 11, there exists xˆ
′
j ∈ Q+ where xˆ′j < xˆj
such that
(i, ci, xi)P
(
j, cˆj, xˆ
′
j
)
P (j, cˆj, xˆj) I (j, cj, xj) .
So
(
j, cˆj, xˆ
′
j
) ∈ Y ′ and (i, ci, xi)P (j, cˆj, xˆ′j)P (j, cj, xj).
Case 2: S does not give left priority to (j, cj, xj).
By Lemmas 8 and 11, there exists x′j and x
′′
j such that
(i, ci, xi)P
(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P (j, cj, xj) .
Since S does not give left priority to (j, cj, xj), there exists (k, ck, xk) where k 6= j
such that
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
R1 (k, ck, xk)R1 (j, cj, xj) with one of these strict. Without loss of
generality, assume
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P1 (k, ck, xk)P1 (j, cj, xj).
6 Lemma 8 implies that there
exists x′k such that
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P1 (k, ck, x
′
k)P (k, ck, xk). Hence
(i, ci, xi)P
(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P
(
j, cj, x
′
j
)
P1 (k, ck, x
′
k)P (k, ck, xk)P1 (j, cj, xj) .
Claim: There exists  > 0 such that for every cˆk ∈ (ck, ck + ), (k, cˆk, x′k)P1 (j, cj, xj).
Suppose not. Then for every n ∈ N, there exists cnk ∈
(
ck, ck +
1
n
)
such that
(j, cj, xj)R1 (k, c
n
k , x
′
k). Observe that c
n
k → ck. Lemma 15 implies that for every n,
xj ≤ Sj ((cj, cnk) , xj + x′k) and x′k ≥ Sk ((cj, cnk) , xj + x′k). Since S ((cj, cnk) , xj + x′k)→
S ((cj, ck) , xj + x
′
k) by Continuity, xj ≤ Sj ((cj, ck) , xj + x′k) and x′k ≥ Sk ((cj, ck) , xj + x′k).
But since (k, ck, x
′
k)P (k, ck, xk)P1 (j, cj, xj), Lemma 14 implies xj > Sj ((cj, ck) , xj + x
′
k)
and x′k < Sk ((cj, ck) , xj + x
′
k), a contradiction.
Claim: There exists  > 0 such that for every cˆk ∈ (ck, ck + ),
(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P1 (k, cˆk, x
′
k).
The proof for this claim is similar to the claim above.
These two claims imply that there exists  > 0 such that for every cˆk ∈ (ck, ck + ),(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P1 (k, cˆk, x
′
k)P1 (j, cj, xj). Since Q is dense in R, without loss of generality,
there exists cˆk ∈ Q++ such that
(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P1 (k, cˆk, x
′
k)P1 (j, cj, xj). Lemma 8 im-
plies that there exists xˆk ∈ Q+ such that
(
j, cj, x
′′
j
)
P1 (k, cˆk, xˆk)P (k, cˆk, x
′
k). Hence,
(k, cˆk, xˆk) ∈ Y ′ and (i, ci, xi)P (k, cˆk, xˆk)P1 (j, cj, xj).
A.3 Finishing the Proof
Lemma 17 There exists r : Y → R such that
(i, ci, xi)R (j, cj, xj)⇔ r (i, ci, xi) ≤ r (j, cj, xj) .
Proof. This is a standard result following from Lemmas 2, 10, and 16.
6If
(
j, cj , x
′
j
)
I1 (k, ck, xk), then Lemma 8 implies there exists x
′′
j such that
(i, ci, xi)P1
(
j, cj , x
′′
j
)
P
(
j, cj , x
′
j
)
I1 (k, ck, xk). If (k, ck, xk) I1 (j, cj , xj), then Lemma 8 im-
plies there exists xˆk such that
(
j, cj , x
′
j
)
P1 (k, ck, xˆk)P (k, ck, xk) I1 (j, cj , xj). Hence without loss
of generality,
(
j, cj , x
′
j
)
P1 (k, ck, xk)P1 (j, cj , xj).
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Lemma 18 For every (c, E) ∈ C, i, j ∈ N , and  ∈ (0, cj − Sj (c, E)),
r (i, ci, Si (c, E)) < r (j, cj, Sj (c, E) + ) .
Proof. Let (c, E) ∈ C, i, j ∈ N , and  ∈ (0, cj − Sj (c, E)) 6= ∅ be given. Set
x ≡ S (c, E). Bilateral Consistency implies S ((ci, cj) , xi + xj) = (xi, xj). By the
definition of G, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) ≤ xi + xj. Also, Resource Monotonicity implies
xi + xj < G ((j, cj, xj + ) , i, ci). Hence, G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) < G ((j, cj, xj + ) , i, ci),
which implies (i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj + ), which implies r (i, ci, xi) < r (j, cj, xj + ).
Define a ≡ inf {r (i, ci, xi) : (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y }, b ≡ sup {r (i, ci, xi) : (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y },
and
fi (ci, λ) ≡ sup {x′i : r (i, ci, x′i) ≤ λ} .
Lemma 19 For every (i, ci, xi) ∈ Y , fi (ci, r (i, ci, xi)) = xi.
Proof. By Lemma 7, r (i, ci, xi) is strictly increasing in xi. So
{x′i : r (i, ci, x′i) ≤ r (i, ci, xi)} = {x′i : x′i ≤ xi} ,
which implies
fi (ci, r (i, ci, xi)) = sup {x′i : x′i ≤ xi}
= xi.
Lemma 20 f ≡ (fi) ∈ F .
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and ci > 0.
fi (ci, λ) is weakly increasing in λ: Let λ1, λ2 ∈ [a, b] satisfy λ1 < λ2. Observe
{xi : r (i, ci, xi) ≤ λ1} ⊂ {xi : r (i, ci, xi) ≤ λ2}. Hence, fi (ci, λ1) ≤ fi (ci, λ2).
fi (ci, λ) is continuous in λ: Suppose fi (ci, ·) is discontinuous at λ0. Set
x0 ≡ fi (ci, λ0), x1 ≡ limλ→λ−0 fi (ci, λ), and x2 ≡ limλ→λ+0 fi (ci, λ). Hence x1 < x2
and x0 ∈ [x1, x2]. Let x3 ∈ (x1, x0)∪ (x0, x2). Since fi (ci,λ) is weakly increasing in λ,
there is no λ such that fi (ci,λ) = x3. However, by Lemma 19, fi (ci, r (i, ci, x3)) = x3,
a contradiction.
fi (ci, a) = 0 and fi (ci, b) = ci: By definition of Y , for every λ ∈ [a, b],
0 ≤ fi (ci, λ) ≤ ci. Hence, fi (ci, a) ≥ 0. Also, a ≤ r (i, ci, 0) by definition and
fi (ci, r (i, ci, 0)) = 0 by Lemma 19. But since fi (ci,λ) is weakly increasing in λ,
fi (ci, a) ≤ 0. Hence, fi (ci, a) = 0. We can similarly show that fi (ci, b) = ci.
Lemma 21 f is an asymmetric parametric representation of S.
Proof. Let (c, E) ∈ C. Set x ≡ S (c, E). Set j ≡ arg maxi∈N {r (i, ci, xi)} and λ∗ ≡
r (j, cj, xj). Hence, for every i ∈ N , λ∗ ≥ r (i, ci, xi), so fi (ci, λ∗) ≥ fi (ci, r (i, ci, xi)) =
xi. If xi = ci, then fi (ci, λ
∗) = ci. If xi < ci, then by Lemma 18, for any  ∈
(0, cj − Sj (c, E)), λ∗ = r (j, cj, xj) < r (i, ci, xi + ). Hence, fi (ci, λ∗) ≤ xi +  by
definition of fi. This implies fi (ci, λ
∗) ≤ xi. Hence fi (ci, λ∗) = xi.
27
Lemma 22 If S gives priority to (i, ci, xi) and if c
n
i → ci, then m (i, cni , xi) →
m (i, ci, xi) and M (i, c
n
i , xi)→M (i, ci, xi).
Proof. Suppose m (i, cni , xi) → mˆ < m (i, ci, xi). Let x0 ∈ (mˆ,m (i, ci, xi)). Then
(i, ci, mˆ)C (i, ci, xi) and (i, ci, x0)C (i, ci, xi). Without loss of generality, there exists
(j, cj, xj) where j 6= i such that7
(i, ci, mˆ)P (i, ci, x0)P1 (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, ci, xi) .
By Lemma 14, mˆ < Si ((ci, cj) , mˆ+ xj) and xj > Sj ((ci, cj) , mˆ+ xj).
By N-Continuity, there exists N such that for every n ≥ N , (i, ci, xi)NC (i, cni , xi).
For every n ≥ N , set mn ≡ m (i, cni , xi)+ 1n . (For n < N , set mnto any sequence.) Ob-
viously mn → mˆ. Also (i, cni ,mn)NC (i, cni , xi)NC (i, ci, xi) for every n ≥ N . Hence
(j, cj, xj)P1 (i, c
n
i ,m
n).8 Lemma 15 implies mn ≥ Si ((cni , cj) ,mn + xj) and xj ≤
Sj ((c
n
i , cj) ,m
n + xj) for every n ≥ N . Continuity implies S ((cni , cj) ,mn + xj) →
S ((ci, cj) , mˆ+ xj). Hence mˆ ≥ Si ((ci, cj) , mˆ+ xj) and xj ≤ Sj ((ci, cj) , mˆ+ xj), a
contradiction.
Now suppose m (i, cni , xi) → mˆ > m (i, ci, xi). Let x0 ∈ (m (i, ci, xi) , mˆ). Then S
gives priority to (i, ci, x0) and
(i, ci, x0)NC (i, ci, xi) . (6)
By N-Continuity, there exists N such that for every n ≥ N ,
(i, ci, x0)NC (i, c
n
i , x0) . (7)
Similarly, there exists N ′ such that for every n ≥ N ′,
(i, ci, xi)NC (i, c
n
i , xi) . (8)
Since m (i, cni , xi)→ mˆ, there exists N ′′ such that for every n ≥ N ′′, m (i, cni , xi) > x0,
which implies
(i, cni , x0)C (i, c
n
i , xi) . (9)
Let n ≥ max {N,N ′, N ′′}. Then (6), (7), (8), and the transitivity of NC imply
(i, cni , x0)NC (i, c
n
i , xi), which contradicts (9).
The proof for M is similar.
Lemma 23 Let fi (ci, λ) = xi. If S gives priority to (i, ci, xi) and if c
n
i → ci, then
fi (c
n
i , λ)→ fi (ci, λ).
7Since (i, ci, x0)C (i, ci, xi) and x0 < xi, Lemma 7 implies there exists (j, cj , xj) where j 6= i
such that (i, ci, x0)R1 (j, cj , xj)R1 (i, ci, xi), where one of these is strict. Lemma 8 implies that
it is without loss of generality that (i, ci, x0)R1 (j, cj , xj)P1 (i, ci, xi). If (i, ci, x0) I1 (j, cj , xj),
choose x′0 ∈ (mˆ, x0). Then Lemma 7 implies (i, ci, mˆ)P (i, ci, x′0)P (i, ci, x0). Transitivity implies
(i, ci, mˆ)P (i, ci, x
′
0)P1 (j, cj , xj)P1 (i, ci, xi).
8If (i, cni ,m
n)R1 (j, cj , xj), then (i, c
n
i ,m
n)R (i, ci, xi), which contradicts (i, c
n
i ,m
n)NC (i, ci, xi).
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Proof. Since S gives priority to (i, ci, xi), there exists xˆi where xˆi < xi such that
S gives priority to (i, ci, xˆi) and (i, ci, xˆi)NC (i, ci, xi). Observe that since S gives
priority to xi, Lemma 7 implies θ (i, ci, xi) ∈ (0, 1). By N-Continuity, there exists N
such that for every n ≥ N , (i, ci, xˆi)NC (i, cni , xˆi) and (i, ci, xi)NC (i, cni , xi).
Fix n ≥ N . Hence (i, cni , xˆi)NC (i, cni , xi) by transitivity of NC. Lemma 6 implies
m (i, cni , xˆi) = m (i, c
n
i , xi) and M (i, c
n
i , xˆi) = M (i, c
n
i , xi). Hence m (i, c
n
i , xˆi) ≤ xˆi <
xi ≤M (i, cni , xi) implies m (i, cni , xˆi) < M (i, cni , xi). Set
xni ≡ (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, cni , xi) + θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, cni , xi) .
Observem (i, cni , xi) < x
n
i < M (i, c
n
i , xi) since θ (i, ci, xi) ∈ (0, 1). Hence (i, cni , xni )NC (i, cni , xi).
So by Lemma 6, m (i, cni , x
n
i ) = m (i, c
n
i , xi) and M (i, c
n
i , x
n
i ) = M (i, c
n
i , xi). Then
θ (i, cni , x
n
i ) =
xni −m (i, cni , xni )
M (i, cni , x
n
i )−m (i, cni , xni )
=
xni −m (i, cni , xi)
M (i, cni , xi)−m (i, cni , xi)
= θ (i, ci, xi) .
Since (i, cni , x
n
i )NC (i, c
n
i , xi)NC (i, ci, xi), then r (i, ci, xi) = r (i, c
n
i , x
n
i ) by definition
of R3.
Claim: fi (c
n
i , λ) = x
n
i . Since r (i, c
n
i , x
n
i ) = r (i, ci, xi), then obviously fi (c
n
i , λ) ≥
xni . If fi (c
n
i , λ) > x
n
i , then following an argument similar to the one above, we could
find x0 > xi such that r (i, ci, x0) = r (i, c
n
i , fi (c
n
i , λ)). But r (i, c
n
i , fi (c
n
i , λ)) ≤ λ. So
this would imply r (i, ci, x0) ≤ λ, which implies fi (ci, λ) ≥ x0 > xi, a contradiction.
Hence fi (c
n
i , λ) = x
n
i .
For n < N , let xni = xi. By Lemma 22 and the definition of θ,
xni → (1− θ (i, ci, xi))m (i, ci, xi) + θ (i, ci, xi)M (i, ci, xi)
= xi.
Lemma 24 f is continuous.
Proof. Fix i ∈ N and (cni , λn)→
(
cˆi, λˆ
)
. Let fi (c
n
i , λ
n)→ x∗ and set xˆ ≡ fi
(
cˆi, λˆ
)
.
By way of contradiction, suppose x∗ < xˆ. Set
λ∗ ≡ sup {λ : fi (cˆi, λ) = x∗} .
Observe that fi (cˆi, λ
∗) = x∗ since fi is continuous in λ. Also, since fi is monotone in
λ, λ∗ < λˆ.
Claim: For every j and cj > 0, fj (cj, λ
∗) = fj
(
cj, λˆ
)
. Fix j and cj > 0. For every
n, set En ≡ fi (cni , λn) + fj (cj, λn). Set Eˆ ≡ x∗ + fj
(
cj, λˆ
)
. Observe that since fj
is continuous in λ, fj (cj, λ
n) → fj
(
cj, λˆ
)
. Hence ((cni , cj) , E
n) →
(
(cˆi, cj) , Eˆ
)
. For
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every n, S ((cni , cj) , E
n) = (fi (c
n
i , λ
n) , fj (cj, λ
n)) since {fi}i∈N is an asymmetric para-
metric representation of S. Observe that S ((cni , cj) , E
n) = (fi (c
n
i , λ
n) , fj (cj, λ
n))→(
x∗, fj
(
cj, λˆ
))
. By Continuity, S ((cni , cj) , E
n)→ S
(
(cˆi, cj) , Eˆ
)
. So S
(
(cˆi, cj) , Eˆ
)
=(
x∗, fj
(
cj, λˆ
))
. Also, there exists λ′ such that S
(
(cˆi, cj) , Eˆ
)
= (fi (cˆi, λ
′) , fj (cj, λ′)).
Hence fi (cˆi, λ
′) = x∗ and fj (cj, λ′) = fj
(
cj, λˆ
)
. But by definition of λ∗, λ′ ≤ λ∗.
Hence fj (cj, λ
∗) = fj
(
cj, λˆ
)
since fj is monotone in λ.
Claim: For every λ˜ ∈
(
λ∗, λˆ
)
, either fi
(
cˆi, λ˜
)
= x∗ or fi
(
cˆi, λ˜
)
= xˆ. Fix
λ˜ ∈
(
λ∗, λˆ
)
. Set x˜ ≡ fi
(
cˆi, λ˜
)
. Then x∗ ≤ x˜ ≤ xˆ since fi is weakly increasing in λ.
By way of contradiction, suppose x∗ < x˜ < xˆ. Then the claim above implies S gives
priority to (i, cˆi, x˜). By Lemma 23, fi
(
cni , λ˜
)
→ x˜. Then there exists N such that for
every n ≥ N , fi
(
cni , λ˜
)
> x
∗+x˜
2
. Since fi (c
n
i , λ
n) → x∗, there exists N ′ such that for
every n ≥ N ′, fi (cni , λn) < x
∗+x˜
2
. Since λn → λˆ, there exists N ′′ such that for every
n ≥ N ′′, λn > λ˜. So for n ≥ max {N,N ′, N ′′}, fi
(
cni , λ˜
)
> x
∗+x˜
2
> fi (c
n
i , λ
n). But
since λ˜ < λn and fi is increasing in λ, fi
(
cni , λ˜
)
< fi (c
n
i , λ
n), a contradiction.
But this claim contradicts the fact that fi is continuous in λ. Hence x
∗ ≥ xˆ.
Similarly one can show x∗ ≤ xˆ. Hence x∗ = xˆ.
B Proof of Theorem 2
The necessity of the axioms is straightforward. We show now that the axioms are
sufficient.
Lemma 25 For every (i, ci, xi), j 6= i, and cj, there exists xj such that (i, ci, xi) I1 (j, cj, xj).
Proof. Set xj ≡ S ((ci, cj) , G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj)). Then Strict Resource Monotonicity
implies G ((i, ci, xi) , j, cj) = G ((j, cj, xj) , i, ci).
Lemma 26 S satisfies Intrapersonal Consistency and N-Continuity.
Proof. Suppose Intrapersonal Consistency was not satisfied. Then there exists
(i, ci, xi), (j, cj, xj), (i, c
′
i, x
′
i), and
(
j, c′j, x
′
j
)
such that
(i, ci, xi)P1 (j, cj, xj)P1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)P1
(
j, c′j, x
′
j
)
P1 (i, ci, xi) .
Fix k and ck where k is distinct from i and j. By Lemma 25, there exist xk and x
′
k
where (j, cj, xj) I1 (k, ck, xk) and
(
j, c′j, x
′
j
)
I1 (k, ck, x
′
k). Case 1 of Lemma 10 implies
(i, ci, xi)P1 (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)P1 (k, ck, x
′
k)P1 (i, ci, xi) .
Observe that (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)P1 (k, ck, x
′
k) and Lemma 7 imply xk ≤ x′k. Sim-
ilarly, (k, ck, x
′
k)P1 (i, ci, xi)P1 (k, ck, xk) and Lemma 7 imply x
′
k ≤ xk. Hence x′k =
xk.But this is impossible since (k, ck, xk)P1 (i, c
′
i, x
′
i) and (i, c
′
i, x
′
i)P1 (k, ck, x
′
k).
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N-Continuity is satisfied vacuously because there is no (i, ci, xi) to which S gives
priority because S is strictly resource monotonic.
Hence, the proof follows that of Theorem 1 to derive the parametric function f .
All there is left to prove is that, without loss of generality, fi is strictly increasing in
λ for every i.
Lemma 27 For any i, ci, λ, and λ
′ where λ < λ′, if fi (ci, λ) = fi (ci, λ′), then for
any j and cj, fj (ci, λ) = fj (ci, λ
′).
Proof. Fix j 6= i and cj. Suppose fj (ci, λ) < fj (ci, λ′). Since f is a parametric
representation of S,
S ((ci, cj) , fi (ci, λ) + fj (ci, λ)) = (fi (ci, λ) , fj (ci, λ)) ,
and
S ((ci, cj) , fi (ci, λ
′) + fj (ci, λ′)) = (fi (ci, λ′) , fj (ci, λ′)) .
But fi (ci, λ) = fi (ci, λ
′) and fj (ci, λ) < fj (ci, λ′), which contradicts Strict Resource
Monotonicity. Hence fj (ci, λ) = fj (ci, λ
′).
Using the fact that fj (ci, λ) = fj (ci, λ
′), one can show fi (c′i, λ) = fi (c
′
i, λ
′) for
any c′i in a like manner.
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